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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
result in intangible benefits. Thus it is the Troppi-Coleman approach
which seems best suited to weigh these various factors as they arise.
If the submission of the damage issue to the jury illustrates a judicial
conformance with a previous or coincident shift in social perception of
the ethics of family planning, the question of how well the plaintiff-
parents fare with the jury remains unsettled. The only reported case
illustrating a jury verdict in an unwanted child situation is Ball v.
Mudge,20 decided in 1964. There a jury determined, and an appellate
court affirmed that the plaintiff-parents suffered no damage from the
birth of a normal child.
Under the Troppi analysis of benefits, it may well be that the Ball
jury would award damages where the controlling facts are sufficiently
compelling, as in the case of the unwed mother. It is conceivable that a
jury finding that benefits outweigh injury is now capable of being re-
versed as clearly erroneous. If this is so, then the Troppi court has in-
deed reversed the roles of court and public perception. For now the
courts will have power to insist that standard rules of law regarding
malpractice, and legal concepts of benefit and burden resulting from
wrongful conduct, be applied in birth control cases. That power will
prohibit the imposition of social perceptions which do not coincide with
legal principles, and should lead to frequent success for plaintiffs seek-
Ing compensation for unwanted births.
ROBERT L. WINIKOFF
Trial Procedure-BOMBSHELL INSTRUCTION FOR DEADLOCKED JURIES:
ABA STANDARD REPLACES Allen CHARGE IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Unted States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
In the past, trial judges employed various devices in order to prod a
deadlocked jury into reaching a verdict.' However, the feasibility of
20. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
1. By the ancient common law, jurors were kept together as prisoners of the
court until they had agreed upon their verdict. [This required that they
be] [K]ept without meat, drink, fire, or candle, unless by permission of the
judge, till they are all unanimously agreed.
People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268, 275, 50 N.E. 840, 842 (1898)
The reasons commonly given for such action are that a hung jury results in consider-
able loss of tine and money, and represents a failure of the jury system. Comment,
Defusing the Dynanmte Charge: A Critique of Allen and its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REv.
749 (1969). See Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); A.MEuaAc BAR AssocAToN, STANDAns
RELATING TO TRaiL BY JuRy 154 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDAs].
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bringing extreme pressure to bear on the deadlocked jury has diminished
in more recent years due to the advent of the rule that a coerced verdict
constitutes reversible error.2 One device, involving the use of a supple-
mental instruction given when the jury reports its inability to agree or
when the trial judge decides that the jury has had sufficient time to reach
a verdict, continues to be widely used. The vast majority of these in-
structions are based, at times quite tenuously, on the instruction ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States. The language
approved by the Court was
[T] hat in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not
be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each
individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion
of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted
with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opin-
ions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they
could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposi-
tion to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the
larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should
consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no
impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest,
equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the
majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a
judgment which was not concurred in by the majority 4
While the Allen charge itself has not been held unconstitutional, 5 it
is generally recognized as establishing the limts of permissible jury
promptmg.0 Appellate court reversal of convictions involving jury
2. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); Wissel v.
United States, 22 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1927); Comment, supra note 1, at 755. See also
State v. Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963), reversing a conviction because
jurors had not slept for over twenty-six hours before returning the verdict. Affidavits
from the three jurors in. the mnority stated that they acquiesced m the verdict because
of their exhausted mental condition. 121 N.W.2d at 93-95.
3. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
4. Id. at 501. This instruction had previously been approved by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1 (1851).
5. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 396 U.S.
1017 (1970); ABA STANDAD, supra note 1, at 149; Comment, supra note 1, at 750.
6. United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961); Note, Due Process,
Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexaminatton of the Allen Charge, 53 VA.
L. Rev. 123, 134 (1967); Comment, supra note 1, at 755.
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charges which differ from those approved in Allen are occurring with
increasing regularity 7 These courts are forced to determine whether
a defendant's rights have been prejudiced by jury coercion resulting
from the trial judge's defective instructions or from the circumstances
under which the instructions were d'elivered.8 Factors to be considered
on appeal include: the amount of time between the giving of an Allen
charge and the rendition of a verdict;9 whether the trial judge was in-
formed by the jury, either voluntarily or upon inquiry, as to the nu-
merical breakdown of the jury;' and, the wording of the trial judge's
instruction."
In United States v. Rogers,12 a verdict was returned within 17 minutes
after the jury had reported its inability to agree and the trial judge had
7. Although the Allen charge is employed in both civil and criminal cases, attacks
upon its use arise primarily in criminal cases, and it is in that context that this
comment considers the charge.
8. United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
949 (1970); United States v Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 419-20 (3d Cir. 1969); Andrews
v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion); Powell v.
United States, 297 F.2d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 1961); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342
P.2d 197, 200 (1959); ABA STANDARD, supra note 1, at 155; Comment, supra note 1,
at 759; 34 TuL. L. REv. 214, 215-16 (1959). Thus any time and expense saved at the
trial level by use of the Allen charge is nullified on appeal. See United States v.
Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930,
933 (7th Cir. 1969); Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opimon);
ABA STANDARD, supra note 1, at 155; Note, supra note 6, at 149. For statements to the
effect that the Allen charge is growing in use, see Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d
735, 741 (5th Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966);
Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (concurring in part, dissenting
in part), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
Inquiry into the coercive effect of the trial judge's language and the circumstances
surrounding the instruction is necessarily superficial since the issue of whether a juror
was coerced is so subjective that a definitive finding is impossible. United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969); ABA STANDARD, supra note 1, at 153; Note,
supra note 6, at 135. Hence reversals based on factors traditionally considered by
the appellate courts occur only under the most flagrant violations. Comment, supra
note 1, at 760.
9. United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cit. 1961); State v. Pierce, 178 Iowa
417, 159 N.W 1050 (1916). For a discussion of the inconsistencies in applying this
factor see Comment, supra note 1, at 758.
10. Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cit. 1964); Anderson v. United
States, 262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 360 U.S. 929 (1959); Bowen v. United
States, 153 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 328 U.S. 835 (1946).
11. Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cit. 1965); Williams v. United
States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.
1961).
12. 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
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given a deficient Allen-type instruction. Although the instruction had
correctly stated that individual jurors could consider the opinions of
their fellow jurors, it neglected to caution that the verdict should not
represent a mere acquiescence in the majority opinion. Since this instruc-
tion was followed promptly by a verdict, the court concluded that the
result could represent an acceptance by the minority of the majority's
view 13
In Burton v. United States,14 the Supreme Court enunciated the
principle that a trial judge may not inquire into the numerical di-
vision of the jury, even though he does not ask and is not informed
which position either side is taking. The Court held that such inquiries
tended to be coercive and therefore necessitated reversal per se.15 While
Burton is still viable, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
found no error when a trial judge inquired and was told that the jury
was "pretty evenly divided," so long as the revelation was followed only
by a carefully worded instruction."
Deviations from the language of the original Allen charge have caused
appellate courts to find minority juror coercion in reaching a verdict,
but the distinction between acceptable and prohibited alterations is at
times imperceptible. Thus, while the following deviations have been
permitted: "Your failure to agree upon a verdict will necessitate another
trial equally as expensive;" 17 "1 want you to go and decide this case
for me. [A]nd return a verdict;" Is "It is a case that must be de-
cided;" 10 these have led to reversal: "[I]t is no credit to a juror to
stand out in a pure spirit of stubbornness because he has taken a position
,)120 "[T]he rule is that the majority will have better judgment
13. Id. at 436-37
14. 196 U.S. 283 (1905) The Court's inquiry was followed by delivery of the Allen
charge. Id. at 305.
15. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926), rev.g 8 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1925).
While the Supreme Court made no reference to the Allen charge, that such an instruc-
non was given and raised on appeal is evidenced by the decision of the circuit court
of appeals. Brasfield v. United States, 8 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1925).
16. Anderson v. United States, 262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959).
17. Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 738-39 n.2 (5th Cir. 1965).
18. Sandefur v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky 655, 137 S.W 504, 508 (1911).
19. Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1960).
20. Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1961). The trial judge also.
informed the jury "If you follow the principles of law given you by the Court and
if you recall the evidence m this case you ought to be able to agree upon a verdict2'
Id. at 320. These two statements combined to place the charge beyond permissible
linumts.
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than a mere minority ", 21 "A jury may arbitrarily set at defiance
law and reason, and refuse to convict the accused by returning a verdict
of not guilty" 22
Due to the possible prejudice of defendants' rights2s caused by devia-
tions from the original Allen instruction and because of the resulting
number of appeals, appellate courts have urged trial judges to stay within
the bounds of the original Allen charge when delivering a supplemental
instruction.2 However, there has been mounting criticism of the Allen
charge itself, based upon the theory that 'even in its original form, the
Allen statement is coercive.25 It is argued that the innumerable instances
of review, often turning on subtle differences of fact, do not result in
the efficient and just administration of law 26 In 1959, the Arizona Su-
preme Court stated:
It now appears that its continued use will result in an endless chain
of decisions, each link thereof tempered and forged with varying
facts and circumstances and welded with ever-changing personali-
ties of the appellate court. This is not in keeping with sound
justice and the preservation of human liberties and security We
are convinced that the evils far outweigh the benefits, and decree
that its use shall no longer be tolerated and approved by this
court 2 7
The lead of the Arizona Supreme Court has been followed by four other
coulrts.2 18
Several alternatives to the Allen charge have been suggested in lieu
of complete abandonment of any supplemental charge aimed at pro-
motmg jury unanimity These alternatives include: altering the lan-
guage of the charge so that it addresses the majority as well as the
21. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962).
22. Wissel v. United States, 22 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1927).
23. It has been observed that employment of the Allen charge is more likely to
result m a conviction than an acquittal. Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530, 531
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Comment, supra note 1, at 761-62. But cf. United States v
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
24. E.g., Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
25. Note 6 supra.
26. See United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969); ABA STANDARD,
supra note 1, at 150; 34 TuL. L. REv. 214, 217 (1959).
27. State v. Thomas, 86 Arz. 161, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959).
28. United States v Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v
Fioravant, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th
Cir. 1969); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
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mnnority;9 giving the charge before the jury has begun its delibera-
tions;40 and, framing the instruction in such a way that the jury is
merely informed of its duty to reason together, omitting any emphasis
on the necessity of a verdict.31
After a comprehensive inquiry into the problems created by the Allen
charge and possible alternatives, the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on the Crin al Trial recommended that the following standard
be adopted:
Length of Deliberations: deadlocked jury
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give
an instruction which informs the jury-
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done
without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only
after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow
jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesi-
tate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if con-
vinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender hs honest conviction as to
the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opluon
of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their delibera-
tions and may give or repeat an instruction as provided m the
subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require
the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for
unreasonable intervals.
29. Note, supra note 6, at 146.
30. Burrup v. Urted States, 371 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1033 (1967); Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1966); Note,
supra note 6, at 147; 34 Tut.. L. REv. 214, 217 (1959). But see Burrup v. United
States, 371 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1967) (Phillips, J., concurring), concluding that
the Allen charge has such a potential for coercion that it should not be given until it
appears necessary
31. Burroughs v. Umted States, 365 F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1966); Note, supra note
6, at 146-47; Comment, Deadlocked juries and Dynanjte: A Critical Look at the "Allen
Cbarge," 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 386, 393-94 (1964); 34 TuL. L. REv. 214, 217 (1959).
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(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of
agreement.32
In Unted States v. Thomas,3 3 the most recent case to prohibit use of the
Allen charge, it was decreed that trial courts in the District of Columbia
must comply with the ABA standard,4 and adopt the instruction ap-
proved by the ABA Committee 5
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has frequently en-
countered deviations from the original Allen charge, and the transition
to an alternate instruction was inevitable. In 1966, the court had noted
the considerable amount of work occasioned by these deviations from
the Allen language and had urged trial judges to "[c]onsistently use a
form of Instruction plainly within Allen." "6 Four years later the court
entertained yet another appeal based upon alterations of Allen's orig-
inal language.aT While affirming the conviction, the court recommended
future compliance with the ABA standard, but, due to the absence of
a full court, failed to make the ABA standard mandatory 38  One year
later, the court in Thomas mandated future compliance with the ABA
proposal.
32. ABA STANDARD, supra note 1, at 145-46.
33. 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc, under supervisory power).
34. The seventh circuit has also made compliance with the ABA standard manda-
tory on its district courts. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933-34 (7th Cir.
1969).
35. The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In
order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your
verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate
with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence
to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself,
but do so only after an imparual consideration of the evidence with your
fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-
examine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is
erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of evidence solely because of the opimon of your fellow jurors,
or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. Your sole
interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
ABA STANmDAR, supra note 1, at 146-47 The third circuit has adopted this instruction,
omitting the first and last paragraphs. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420
n.32 (3d Cir. 1969).
36. Fulwood v. Umted States, 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
37. Umted States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 633-34.
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The ABA approved instruction has vastly improved the language of
the original Allen instruction by omitting reference to minority juror
reconsideration of judgment solely on the basis of minority member-
ship."n Although it has provided a remedy for Allen's linguistic prob-
lems, the ABA standard does not rectify all of Allen's procedural
mfirmities. While the ABA standard has adopted the frequently en-
countered suggestion of permitting the trial judge to deliver the instruc-
tion before the jury begins deliberations,4" regretably it continues to
allow repetition of the instruction should it later appear that the jury is
unable to agree. In fact, the instruction may be given for the first time
at that juncture. At this stage of the proceedings, a minority juror is
likely to view any words indicating the desirability of a verdict as being
directed his way This judicial prodding, even though balanced by the
admoition that no juror should surrender his honest conviction, may
lead to coercion when coupled with similar entreatments from his fellow
jurors.4 1 Thus, while the ABA instruction does not contain the poten-
tially coercive language of Allen, even its modified phraseology may
have a stultifying effect on the free will of minority members of a
deadlocked jury 2
Employment of the ABA approved instruction as a supplemental
instruction is likely to perpetuate many of the problems appellate courts
currently face when considering Allen-type charges. Since it appears
that the ABA approved instruction is potentially coercive if delivered
to a deadlocked jury, appellate courts should continue to consider the
time period between delivery of the instruction and rendition of a
39. Because this portion of the original Allen charge contains no reference to ma-
jority jurors reconsidering their position, and therefore appears to place the trial judge
on the side of the majority, it has been the most severely criticized. United States v.
Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d
407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969); ABA STANDARm, supra note 1, at 147; Note, supra note 6, at
143; Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 139-40 (1968); Comment,
supra note 1, at 754-56.
40. Note 30 supra.
41. Cluef Justice Fuller has commented:
It is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence of the
trial judge is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest
word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.
Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 754-56.
42. No matter how blandly phrased, any instruction delivered once the jury is
deadlocked will have a tendency to coerce minority jurors into changing their vote
in order to produce a verdict. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir.
1969); Note, supra note 6, at 148 n.101. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 754.
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verdict.4  Moreover, it would be naive to assume that the same trial
judges who strayed from the language of the original Allen instruction
will now invariably instruct in conformity with the ABA standard.44
Therefore, appellate courts will continue to be plagued by protesta-
tions when the ABA instruction is not followed literally Furthermore,
employment of the ABA standard as a supplemental instruction may
continue to block trial court inquiries into the numerical division of the
deadlocked jury It will be remembered that this helpful procedure45
necessitated reversal per se when coupled with an Allen-type charge.4 6
It appears that the average juror approaches his duty with a sense of
responsibility and fairness.47 If the minority juror begins deliberation
in a favorable frame of mind and prior to deliberation is properly in-
structed of his duty to reason with other jurors, his failure to agree with
the majority should be permitted to stand.P 8 Comments from the bench
at this psychological low-point in the proceedings are lilly to fall on
receptive ears and amount to judicial intrusion into the exclusive pro-
vince of the jury In adopting the ABA standard and approved mstruc-
non, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has lessened tht
opportunity for prejudice to the defendant. But the possibility for
coercion will continue to exist whenever trial judges employ a supple-
mental instruction geared toward producing a verdict. It is hoped that
appellate courts in the future will adopt the ABA standard or similar
instructions, but will prohibit the use of any such instruction after the
jury has begun deliberations.
J. GRANT CORBOY
43. Note 9 supra. The effect of such a standard is to provide that an instruction may
be reversible error if something occurs after it is given. ABA STANDm, supra note 1,
at 154. This supports the position that the problem lies with the use of any supple-
mental instruction directed toward producing a verdict.
44. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
45. If the trial judge is informed that the jury is equally divided after substantial
deliberation, declaration of a mistrial will avoid further expenditures of time. Con-
versely, upon disclosure of a small minority the judge may wish to send the jury
back for further deliberations. United States v Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435-36 (4th Cir.
1961). But see Comment, supra note 31, at 393, suggesting that sending the jury back
without instruction may be coercive.
46. Brafield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
47. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMEticANwJtuRY 453-63 (1966).
48. The position has been taken that the hung jury performs a service equally as
important as the jury which returns a verdict. See generally Huffman v. United States,
297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054, 1058
(1960).
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